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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence of the last 100 
years has embraced the creativity trope.  Spurred in part by themes 
associated with the story of “romantic authorship” in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, copyright critiques likewise ask, “Who is creative?” “How 
should creativity be protected (or not) and encouraged (or not)?” and 
“Why protect creativity?”  Policy debates and scholarship in recent 
years have focused on the concept of creativity in framing copyright 
disputes, transactions, and institutions, reinforcing the notion that 
these are the central copyright questions.  I suggest that this focus on 
the creativity trope is unhelpful.  I argue that digital technologies and 
the explosion of amateur art challenge the usefulness of creativity as 
the organizing principle for copyright law.  I propose that knowledge 
should be restored as copyright’s core concept.  I illustrate that 
argument with the art and writing of Vincent van Gogh, who is often 
used to illustrate the idea of the prototypically creative author, and I 
draw out some implications from the proposal in terms of legal 
doctrines that relate to producing, distributing, conserving, accessing, 
and sharing knowledge. 
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Shepard Fairey copied a photograph of candidate Barack 
Obama, changed its coloring, enhanced its shading, added some 
campaign iconography, and created one of the singular images of the 
2008 race for the American presidency: the Hope poster.1  For his 
efforts, Fairey was sued for copyright infringement by the Associated 
Press, which claimed a copyright in the photograph.2  Did the Hope 
poster infringe, or was it excused as a matter of fair use?  Reasonable 
people differ.   
The Fairey dispute illustrates how copyright‘s conceptual tools 
are being exhausted by the intersection of art, technology, and 
culture—if those tools were ever adequate to begin with.  When I 
teach copyright law, I show the original Obama photograph and the 
Obama Hope poster to my students.  Even before we get to a 
discussion of whether the former is copyrightable or the latter 
infringes, their reaction is this: Anyone could have produced the 
Obama Hope poster using some cheap or even free software.  Fairey is 
no artist.3  And anyone could have taken the Obama photograph.  How 
is that art? 
These are intuitive reactions that precede formal legal 
analysis, but they point to key topics in copyright.  The photograph is 
copyrightable if it is ―original,‖ that is, if it constitutes ―expression‖ of 
an ―author.‖4  The poster is more likely to be noninfringing if it is 
 
 1. The ―Obama Hope‖ poster that is the centerpiece of the litigation is a derivative of a 
hand-finished stencil collage, which is itself based on a prior ―Obama Progress‖ screen print 
produced by Fairey. See The Giant, Obama Progress, http://www.thegiant.org/wiki/index.php/ 
Obama_Progress (last visited Apr. 9, 2010; see also The Giant, Obama Hope Stencil Collage on 
Paper, http://www.thegiant.org/wiki/index.php/Obama_Hope_Stencil_Collage_on_Paper (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
 2. The lawsuit and the events that led up to it are described, with copies of the relevant 
images, in Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 451-54 (2009). 
 3. In fact, Fairey is a professional artist, though he and his work are controversial. See 
The Giant, Shepard Fairey, http://www.thegiant.org/wiki/index.php/Shepard_Fairey (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2010). The students‘ reaction is to the Obama Hope poster, not to the stencil collage. 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
Madison_final 6/26/2010  2:14 PM 
2010] COPYRIGHT AS KNOWLEDGE LAW 819 
 
―transformative.‖5  On both sides of the equation, intuition and the 
law coincide in a search for creativity.  My students are unimpressed 
by the creativity alleged by both sides in this case.   
The conceptual exhaustion at work here is the failure of 
creativity as a concept to help observers differentiate things that 
copyright values and protects from things that copyright excludes and 
things that copyright penalizes.  Fairey and his poster are merely 
notable examples.  Similar difficulties afflict audio and video works, 
particularly those produced with inexpensive digital technology,6 and 
in so-called ―fact-based‖ works that collect and distribute bits of data.7  
In each of these contexts, the law struggles to deal with the core 
―what?‖ issues of copyright law: what should the law protect, and what 
should it not protect?  In both cases, why? 
To all outward appearances, creativity is the undisputed 
―what?‖ of copyright.  The proposition that creativity is the very point 
of copyright is reflected throughout copyright doctrine.  The effective 
scope of copyright has always been limited to an author‘s ―expression‖8 
and has been grounded formally since 1991 in the proposition that 
copyright protection attaches to any original work of authorship that 
displays a ―modicum‖ of that close cousin of expression, ―creativity.‖9  
Some courts require that copyrightable derivative works, adapted 
from earlier sources, display even larger dollops of creativity than 
―ordinary‖ works must, so that copyright law can distinguish between 
copyrightable new works and separately copyrightable or public 
domain predecessors.10  A copyrighted work is more likely to succeed 
against a fair use defense if the work is deemed to be ―creative;‖ a 
 
 5. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006). 
 6. See Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 845-46 (2009) (describing the challenges for 
copyright law posed by so-called ―User-Generated Content‖).  
 7. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 186-89 
(2008) (criticizing use of the ―creativity‖ framework to analyze copyrightability of numbers for 
fasteners).  
 8. ―Expression‖ appears in quotation marks partly because the reference is to 
―expression‖ as a copyright term of art. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (identifying the subject 
matter of copyright as works of authorship fixed in tangible media of expression). ―Expression‖ 
as a term of art is linked closely to colloquial usage of the term ―expression.‖ Additionally, the 
term ―expression‖ appears in quotation marks to denote the distinction between the colloquial 
meaning of expression and the colloquial meaning of expression and the use of expression as a 
term of art in the Copyright Act. 
 9. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-47 (1991). 
 10. Entm‘t Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1218-20 
(9th Cir. 1997); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-05 (7th Cir. 1983); see 17 U.S.C. § 
106(2) (2006).  
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work accused of infringement is more likely to be acquitted as fair use 
if it is labeled ―transformative‖—that is, if it is creative.11  The law‘s 
emphasis on creativity is premised on the idea, sometimes explicit and 
often implicit in law, policy, and culture, that creativity is not merely 
an individual and a social good, but the definitive good of its 
intangible kind, the highest and best use to which a human mind may 
be put.12  The United States Constitution links copyright with 
promoting ―Progress.‖13  Pursuing creativity, in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court, is the legal strategy that copyright adopts to achieve 
that goal.14 
As creativity law, copyright is oversold.  The ubiquity of 
copyright and the ubiquity of creativity suggest that society has more 
creativity law than it needs.  It needs more of something else.  I 
suggest that copyright should be reconsidered as a species of 
knowledge law. 
Why?  Creativity may never have been more widespread than 
it is today.  Consider the following dose of history.  Traditional 
hierarchies of producing, distributing, and consuming creative and 
expressive products were based on scarcity: the scarcity of training in 
the disciplines of creative production, the scarcity of access to the tools 
and technologies of creative production, and the scarcity of creative 
goods themselves.15  Viewed from the supply side, only some people 
could be called ―artists‖ or ―creators,‖ whether they were supported by 
patrons, by firms, or by their own labors.  Only some people had access 
to printing presses, to paint and canvas, to movie cameras, or even to 
computers.  Only modest numbers of copies of creative products were 
produced.  Viewed from the consumption side, audiences and 
consumers collectively (if implicitly) understood all of those things; the 
best evidence typically lay in the work of ―creativity‖ itself.  One had 
 
 11. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
 12. That statement offers strong rhetoric, but that rhetoric is consistent with popular 
writing that valorizes creativity as the key to the human soul and to human prosperity and as 
the most complex of brain processes. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF 
HEROES OF THE IMAGINATION (1992); RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND 
HOW IT'S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002); STEVEN 
PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50. 
 15. See generally Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010) (describing in greater detail the social and technological shifts to which 
the text refers). 
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only to look at the work (or to hear it) to discern the investment of 
creative resources that it represented.16   
Today, in contrast to that stylized and condensed history, many 
of those sources of scarcity, if not all of them, have fallen away.  
Socially, culturally, and legally, the world exhibits a plenitude of 
creativity.17  On philosophical grounds, economic grounds, and 
technological grounds, it has never been easier for anyone to create, to 
access the tools of creation, and to make creative works accessible to 
enormous numbers of people, via copies and otherwise.18  ―Amateur 
art,‖ which is creativity produced by all kinds of people and for all 
kinds of reasons, is on the rise.19  Professor Daniel Gervais 
characterizes amateur art as creativity that is as public and as 
potentially commercial as professional art.20  This plenitude of 
 
 16. Feist itself emphasizes that a work of authorship is copyrightable if, through its 
appearance, it possesses minimal creativity. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also GRANT 
MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION 68 (1988) (concluding that an object is ―an unusually 
cunning and oblique device for the representation of fundamental cultural truths‖); Laura A. 
Heymann, A Tale of (at Least) Two Authors: Focusing Copyright Law on Process over Product, 34 
J. CORP. L. 1009, 1021 (2009) (noting copyright‘s insistence on evaluating the work of authorship 
itself). Departures from this standard are noteworthy for their infrequency. See Brandir Int'l, 
Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding in the context of 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that copyrightability should turn on the relationship 
between the work and the process of industrial design).  
 17. The relevant world in this context is the developed Western world. Cf. Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1497 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND 
FREEDOM (2006)) (arguing that emerging forms of ―social‖ production–a close cousin of broad 
―amateur‖ creativity–depend on the existence of excess capacity to produce possessed by 
individuals).  
 18. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). Because of his commitment to liberal political 
philosophy, Benkler at times advances a distinctly traditional view of authorship within his 
manifesto for peer production. Networks are valuable, in his view, because they enable the 
fulfillment of the idea that all of us, as individuals, are authors of our own lives and manifest 
maximal autonomy with respect to our creations, i.e., our selves. See id. at 9. In the broad sense 
of determining the paths of our lives, in other words, we are all creators, all the time. See also 
Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1182, 
1190-91 (2007) (linking the idea of individual freedom to engage in ―creative play‖ with cultural 
objects with the idea of self-constitution). 
 19. I choose the term ―amateur art‖ partly because it is catchier than cousins with more 
popular currency, such as ―User-Generated Content,‖ and partly because it does not project the 
proposition that the legal and social questions that it poses are solely or even primarily 
economic. No term is bias-free. As ―amateur art‖ is used in the text, the term intentionally 
obscures the line between the amateur artist who does not produce art for a living and the 
professional artist who does. The focus on amateur art evokes equally challenging questions of 
copyright-based line-drawing in conceptual art and appropriation art. See Laura A. Heymann, 
Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 460-
62 (2008). 
 20. See Gervais, supra note 6, at 844-46. 
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creativity is in many ways a wonderful thing, but it comes at a cost: 
the work of authorship itself is no longer a reliable guide to its 
creative value, culturally or legally. 
Shepard Fairey‘s Hope poster illustrates this difficulty.  The 
poster may not be amateur art, but, as my students asked, how can 
one tell?  The ubiquity of creativity in copyright leads lawyers, judges, 
scholars, and even students to investigate proxies for creativity.  The 
―who?‖ of copyright substitutes for the ―what?‖ of copyright.21  Who is a 
creator for purposes of copyright law, and how should that person or 
enterprise be defined and recognized, whether the topic is authors who 
own copyrights in the first instance, publishers and other 
intermediaries who distribute works of authorship, or producers of 
noninfringing adaptations and reuses of original works?  Who among 
those needs the incentive to create or distribute that copyright 
provides?  Who would create new works regardless of that incentive 
and, absent copyright, avoid imposing on society the social costs that 
accompany legal protection for creativity?22  As my students asked 
indirectly, is Shepard Fairey an amateur artist, or a professional?  Is 
he an author, or is he a new user?  Both?  The work itself yields few 
clues, if any.   
These are examples of ―who?‖ analysis, which follows from the 
Supreme Court‘s minimalist approach to copyright as creativity law.  
As creativity has become the ―what?‖ of copyright, pursuing creativity 
as copyright‘s subject and object has given lawyers, policymakers, 
scholars, and even creators themselves a weak conceptual vocabulary 
for addressing hard questions in the digital age.  Fairey and his poster 
are only partly representative of the problem.  The broader challenge 
is this: if everyone is a creator and if everything is creative, then there 
is little reason to dispute the conclusion that all things and all people 
should be well-blanketed by copyright—or that none should be.  
Copyright law includes a small set of tools for metering legal 
protection based on types of creativity,23 but copyright‘s intentionally 
 
 21. The ―who?‖ and the ―how?‖ of creative production in traditional hierarchies may have 
overlapped historically with the ―what?‖ of creativity, but today those variables often operate 
independently, or more independently, than in the past. 
 22. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009). See generally Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship 
Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 
(2008).  
 23. Copyright contains a handful of policy levers within the creativity construct. See, 
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006) (describing ―the nature of the copyrighted work‖ as a factor to 
account for in fair use cases); Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(establishing the idea of ―thin‖ copyright for fact-based works). 
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weak way of asking ―what?‖ has given the law a set of unsatisfying 
―who?‖ questions.   
This combined weak sense of ―what?‖ and inadequate sense of 
―who?‖ has provoked a lot of recent commentary.  Some scholars have 
tried to refine copyright‘s originality principle (the origin of the 
creativity trope) by referring to patent‘s non-obviousness standard.24  
Others have sought to contextualize creativity in copyright in order to 
build a more robust vocabulary keyed to the ―who?‖ and ―how?‖ of 
creativity.25  One scholar has proposed saving creativity by linking it 
more expressly to the economics of market failure.26  Some scholars 
have sought to redefine copyright in institutional or structural terms, 
although that institutional premise leads to new ―who?‖ responses.  In 
that vein, Professor Robert Merges argues that the rise of ―collective 
creativity,‖ or creativity expressed in a variety of informal group 
settings, suggests the need for copyright to develop a framework for 
―group IP rights‖ to accompany what he regards as copyright‘s historic 
and appropriate solicitude for ―creative professionals.‖27  Professor 
Neil Netanel argues that copyright does too much to protect 
professional producers and far too little to enable small creators, 
independents, and amateurs who contribute so much to society‘s 
expressive diversity.28 
I join this group of scholars in examining the law through an 
institutional lens, but I offer a different premise.  I do not want to save 
creativity.  I want to marginalize it.  More—more creativity, more 
creative goods, more creators—is not necessarily better; more is 
merely different.  More can be socially or individually harmful; more 
can be wasteful.29  Creativity, as a way to assess the strengths and 
 
 24. See Miller, supra note 2, at 485. Patent law itself is tempted by the sirens of 
creativity. See KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Rejecting the notion that the 
―ordinary artisan‖ standard in patent law should be applied woodenly, leaving the door open to 
patents on inventions that inventors with common sense in the relevant technical art would 
recognize as obvious, the Supreme Court wrote, ―[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of 
ordinary creativity.‖ Id. at 421. 
 25. See generally Cohen, supra note 18. 
 26. See Karjala, supra note 7. For a related argument that ties a sliding originality and 
creativity scale in copyright to the incentives that the copyright system is meant to provide, see 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009). A broader effort to 
situate copyrightable creativity in an economic model defined by a limited monopoly theme is 
represented by Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
 27. Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of 
Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1187-89 (2009); Robert P. Merges, The Concept of 
Property in the Digital Era, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1239, 1273 (2008).  
 28. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 81-108 (2008). 
 29. See Beebe, supra note 15, at 69-77. 
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weaknesses of this system and particular acts within it, and as a basis 
for the social organization constructed in part by copyright, cannot 
carry the weight it has been assigned.  Even in cultural and social 
context, and even in the institutional proposals of Merges and 
Netanel, the ―who?‖ and ―how?‖ of copyright, the questions prompted 
by copyright‘s focus on creativity, slight the ―what?‖ of copyright.  
Instead, those questions lead to theories of behavior.  Copyright as 
creativity law becomes a way of thinking about motivation, influence, 
and power, rather than a way of thinking about what sorts of things 
society wants to produce, preserve, share, and have access to. 
I argue that the concept of knowledge should be rehabilitated 
as an anchor for copyright, and perhaps for all law dealing with 
products of the mind and hand.30  Copyright debates often simply 
assume creativity as a goal.31  But the concept of secular creativity has 
little traction in law or in literature prior to the nineteenth century.32  
Is there a better alternative?  Can reopening the question of ―what?‖ 
give copyright a better set of conceptual tools?  What should the law 
protect, and why?33  My answer is that although creativity should not 
be excluded from copyright, copyright should be conceived primarily as 
a system for producing, distributing, conserving, sharing, and 
ensuring access to knowledge.   
From the standpoint of the legal system, using knowledge as a 
conceptual framework for copyright has some important advantages 
over creativity.  The most important of these is that knowledge is 
difficult, while creativity is comparatively easy.  For legal purposes, 
society has a reasonably good grasp of what creativity is and where 
creativity comes from.  Creativity is the art of the new, and it is the 
 
 30. On the latter point, this piece is related to Michael J. Madison, Creativity and Craft, 
in CREATIVITY, LAW, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Robin Paul Malloy & Shubha Ghosh eds., 
forthcoming 2010), and Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2039 (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 
(2005) (describing copyright as an exercise in managing ―a sound balance between the respective 
values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in 
new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright 
infringement‖); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (noting that ―the grant of exclusive 
rights to their respective writings and discoveries is intended to encourage the creativity of 
‗Authors and Inventors‘‖). 
 32. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Creativity” and “Tradition,” 44 J. HIST. IDEAS 105 (1983). 
 33. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It's an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright's 
Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 189 (2005). Neil Netanel‘s recent book is an 
ambitious attempt to combine the ―who?,‖ ―what?,‖ and ―why?‖ of copyright under the rubric of 
free expression principles and their connection to democratic self-government found in the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See NETANEL, supra note 28.  
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product of the individual mind.34  As new creativity takes form, that 
cognitive premise intersects with investigations into material culture 
and social practice, including arguments over whether people create 
for love or for money,35 whether and when creativity is cumulative,36 
and whether and when creativity is collective.37  Copyright gets 
traction at this point, both legally and culturally.  It absorbs and 
reflects questions framed by the creativity construct.  By comparison, 
knowledge is difficult.  Philosophers have been arguing for centuries 
over the nature of knowledge.  In the last one hundred years, their 
questions were joined by those of economists and sociologists.38  Little 
of these investigations, that is, knowledge about knowledge, have 
made their way into copyright law, or even into intellectual property 
law generally.   
Because knowledge is relatively difficult, copyright as 
knowledge law offers a landscape of opportunity.  Lawmakers and 
policymakers can wrestle with challenging questions of line-drawing 
in copyright by asking and answering questions about the role of 
knowledge in society, rather than solely by trying to map accepted 
wisdom about creativity to new situations.  The very fact that 
knowledge about knowledge is hard may, surprisingly, help 
policymakers find better answers to copyright‘s amateur art 
challenges than they have found so far in the comparatively easy 
landscape of creativity. 
Part I of this Article briefly recalls the conceptual and doctrinal 
landscape of creativity in copyright.  This material is mostly familiar 
to copyright lawyers and scholars, as it follows the emergence of the 
creativity theme in law and literature since the mid-1850s.  That 
emergence is often connected with an argument about authorship in 
copyright.  This Part suggests some ways in which restoring a focus on 
knowledge opens a conceptual landscape that is related to but distinct 
from the newer landscape of creativity.  Part II explores the heart of 
the creativity/knowledge question with an illustration grounded in the 
 
 34. See, e.g., MIHÁLY CSÍKSZENTMIHÁLYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988). 
 35. See Tushnet, supra note 22. 
 36. See Cohen, supra note 18. The law may have a reasonably good sense of creativity, 
but that sense is far from perfect, or uncontested. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of 
Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).  
 37. See Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 27. 
 38. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1962) (collecting information on the economics of the so-called knowledge 
industry). 
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authorship trope, the work of Vincent van Gogh.  This Part explores 
what it means to put knowledge at the center of copyright law.  Part 
III looks at copyright doctrine and its applications of copyright to 
amateur art and digital technology that might make more sense (or be 
more or less persuasive) in a framework specified by copyright as 
knowledge law.  Part IV concludes with some implications for 
copyright law and scholarship. 
I. FROM KNOWLEDGE TO CREATIVITY 
What do I mean by the term ―knowledge‖?  The following broad 
definition of knowledge serves as a starting point:  
There is the philosopher‘s knowledge: justified true belief, propositional knowledge, and 
knowledge how and knowledge of, all of which require careful delineation of 
justification, truth, and belief.  There is the other philosopher‘s knowledge, phenomenal 
knowledge, which is not wholly distinct from our experience of the world.  Law and 
policy speak of knowledge in broader, looser, and more general terms, with a small ―k‖ 
rather than a big ―K,‖ perhaps.  Knowledge in the small ―k‖ sense includes information 
about the world and ourselves, various forms and practices of art and science (in both 
classical and modern senses), tools for knowing (reason and belief), as well as the 
diverse products of knowing. This small ―k‖ knowledge includes fiction, film, secrets, and 
computer programs.39 
That broad beginning is needed because knowledge, in both 
copyright law and in public policy generally, has lived a primitive 
existence.  Knowledge is both new and old.  It is tangible and 
intangible, explicit and tacit.40  Knowledge is cumulative and 
collective.  Knowledge starts off both inside us and out in the world.  
Generating, distributing, storing, ensuring access to and benefiting 
from knowledge requires opportunity, effort, and investment.  All of 
those things take place in suitable institutional environments, such as 
the environments supplied and promoted by copyright and patent law, 
as well as in the minds and at the hands of individuals.   
Once upon a time, at the dawn of modern copyright, that 
institutional perspective on knowledge informed the kernel of 
copyright law.  Policymakers referred to the scope and purpose of the 
 
 39. See Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, supra note 30, at 2043.  
 40. For discussion of distinctions among tacit and explicit knowledge, and conceptual 
and tangible knowledge, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge 
Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008); Robin Cowan, Paul A. David & Dominique 
Foray, The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness, 9 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 211 (2000); Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005). 
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law as ―learning‖41 and sometimes as ―Science.‖42  Those terms, while 
a little archaic, are helpful in the present context, particularly because 
they suggest that the idea of copyright as knowledge law is grounded 
initially in copyright‘s origins in the Statute of Anne43 and the United 
States Constitution.44  Knowledge as it is described above is a modern 
analog, though not quite a synonym.  Eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century copyright was limited in scope and modest in ambition.  
English statutory copyright began with books; in the United States, 
the first copyright statute covered maps, charts, and books.45  
Copyright began as a mechanism to ensure that authors and 
publishers had an economic motivation to teach people about their 
world: who and where they were, where they had come from, and 
where they were going, both literally and metaphorically.46  The word 
―teach‖ is used intentionally.  Copyright‘s teaching function was 
shared by patent law.  Even today, patent retains a strong connection 
to its own roots as a species of knowledge law, by insisting that 
patents may be granted on inventions so long as the patent 
specification adequately ―teaches‖ relevant technological disciplines 
how to practice the advance that is to be patented.47 
Modern scholars and even modern courts have not forgotten 
copyright‘s knowledge roots—at least not entirely.  In Harper & Row, 
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court noted that 
 
 41. ―Learning‖ as copyright‘s framework comes from the Statute of Anne, which begins 
with the following preamble: ―An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies 
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein 
mentioned.‖ Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).  
 42. The Constitution grants Congress the power ―[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖ U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 43. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Continental copyright systems, whose solicitude for 
authors is often contrasted with the economic orientation of Anglo-American copyright, was 
likewise grounded initially in the concept of knowledge. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale 
of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 
(1990) (contrasting early American and French copyright systems).  
 45. The works most frequently registered in copyright in early America were textbooks, 
manuals, atlases, and directories. See James Gilreath, American Literature, Public Policy, and 
the Copyright Laws Before 1800, in FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, xv, xv (James 
Gilreath ed., 1987). Copyright‘s ―useful‖ origins are recounted in Bracha, supra note 22, at 209-
24. 
 46. See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 421 (2009).  
 47. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting 
that ―to be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make 
and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‗undue experimentation‘‖). 
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―copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of 
knowledge.‖48  In a recent article, Professor Peter Menell traced the 
history of copyright as a species of knowledge law in analyzing 
Google‘s Book Search digitization project.49  Professor Pamela 
Samuelson used a different meaning of knowledge in analyzing the 
seminal case of Baker v. Selden,50 often cited for the proposition that 
copyright protects expression but not ideas, as a translation of the 
principle that copyright cannot be used to monopolize knowledge.51  
But most observers have tended to take copyright‘s contemporary 
relationship to knowledge for granted, pausing at the concept on their 
way to bigger prey like ―progress‖52 and ―expression.‖53  Beyond 
copyright, decades of policymaking have not refined the relationship 
between law and knowledge.  Modern policymakers develop and rely 
on new knowledge-based catchphrases—the knowledge economy,54 
traditional knowledge,55 and access to knowledge56—with little settled 
understanding of what they mean or what questions they are meant to 
pose or answer.   
Given this background, how did copyright become a law of 
creativity?  In a history that is now familiar to copyright lawyers, 
what is sometimes called the authorship critique displaced knowledge 
as the governing framework for copyright law and, over the course of a 
 
 48. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985). 
 49. See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital 
Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013 (2007). Menell‘s approach is grounded in an account of the legal 
system‘s historical affinity for knowledge preservation and access to knowledge. See id. at 1019-
39. 
 50. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 51. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from 
the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007).  
 52. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (noting that the grant of exclusive 
rights for limited times serves ―the ultimate purpose of promoting the ―Progress of Science and 
useful Arts‖); Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (arguing that the constitutional purpose of copyright should 
be guided by the importance of access to knowledge as a fundamental value). 
 53. See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright, 46 
HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009). Lawrence Lessig‘s recent popular manifesto, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 
(2004), which rhetorically conflates knowledge, creativity, culture, and expression as objects and 
subjects of copyright, is a helpful example. 
 54. See Communication from the Commission: Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, 
COM (2009) 532 final (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/ 
docs/copyright-infso/20091019_532_en.pdf. 
 55. See Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property 
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (2009).  
 56. See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). 
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century, replaced it with creativity.  Some of the transition owes its 
origins and progress to an ideology of creative authorship that 
developed among nineteenth-century critics who advocated for 
expanded legal protection for authors.57  Some of the transition owes 
its origins to enterprises advancing a legal agenda framed by a 
creativity-based concept of originality, in order to bury authors, so to 
speak, rather than to praise them.58  Justice Story‘s opinion in Folsom 
v. Marsh,59 establishing the rudiments of the modern fair use doctrine, 
has been characterized in those terms, as has the Supreme Court‘s 
more recent opinion in International News Service v. Associated 
Press,60 which established the ―hot news‖ misappropriation doctrine as 
a limited exception to the exclusion of facts from copyright.  
Importantly, International News Service drew a distinction between 
the news and the literary form in which it was expressed.61  In that 
case, as well as in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,62 and 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,63 the Court effectively 
defined copyright as creativity law, both technically (in terms of the 
―authorship‖ that Congress was authorized to protect through 
copyright) and rhetorically.64 
The case that represents the apotheosis of copyright as 
creativity law is Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.65  
According to the Court in Feist, the subject matter of copyright is 
broad, that broad field is defined by an author‘s creativity, and 
virtually no true creativity is required to qualify a work as 
 
 57. See Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.-A.D. 2000: An Idea in the 
Balance, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 26, 35; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 459 (1991); Martha Woodmansee, The 
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author,” 17 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984), reprinted in THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: 
REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 49-55 (1994). 
 58. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 59. See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 
434-35 (1998).  
 60. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 61. See Robert Brauneis, The Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era 
Debate over Copyright in News, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 370 (2009).  
 62. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 63. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 64. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (characterizing ―writings‖ in the constitutional 
authorization to enact a copyright statute as all forms ―by which the ideas in the mind of the 
author are given visible expression‖); see also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (―The copy [the original 
work] is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains 
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of 
art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone.‖). 
 65. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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copyrightable.  Originality is a constitutional requirement, the Court 
held, and ―[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that 
the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to 
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity.‖66  Feist‘s discussion of creativity is technically 
dicta, but Feist has nonetheless made it effectively mandatory for 
policymakers and advocates to frame copyright arguments in 
creativity terms.  The minimal creativity threshold ensures that those 
arguments are constrained meaningfully in few ways.67  Facts and 
ideas themselves remain beyond copyright‘s pale;68 in that sense there 
is a synthesis of copyright as creativity law (facts and ideas are not 
―creative‖) and copyright as knowledge law (facts and ideas form a 
body of knowledge that remains free to all).  Is a compilation of fact, 
the work at issue in Feist, protectable by copyright?  The statute 
provides that it is, so long as the underlying materials are ―selected, 
coordinated, or arranged‖ in a way that is original—that is, minimally 
creative.69   
But ―creativity‖ in Feist‘s sense gives advocates and courts few 
tools for distinguishing what is, and what is not, creative.  Creativity 
is mostly binary, and as a legal standard, that binary is substantively 
impotent.  Works pass the creativity threshold if they reflect anything 
beyond standard or automatic selections, and if they rely on non-
functional considerations.70  Creativity therefore misleads.  
Particularly in compilation cases, the focus on creativity leads 
advocates and courts into positions where creativity plays both a 
rhetorical role and a substantive role that is divorced from the 
competition concerns that are characteristically driving these cases.71   
Though Feist deals with copyrightable subject matter, 
creativity themes in fair use cases and in cases involving derivative 
works suffer comparable weaknesses.  In fair use case law, which now 
emphasizes the ―transformative‖ character of works accused of 
infringement, courts perform legal contortions to persuade themselves 
that verbatim reproductions of copyrighted works are 
transformative.72  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has retreated 
 
 66. Id. at 345. 
 67. See Zimmerman, supra note 33. 
 68. See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-49 (1991). 
 69. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of compilation), 103 (2006). 
 70. See Karjala, supra note 7, at 185-200. 
 71. See id.  
 72. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the defendant‘s use of the plaintiff‘s copyrighted concert poster images in a book 
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from its earlier statement that a derivative work may be protected by 
copyright only if it displays a heightened measure of originality.73  
Nearly anything can be creatively original, even a derivative work, 
and nearly anything can be transformative.  In amateur art and 
digital contexts, creativity is incapable of performing the institutional 
and structural functions that scholars of nearly all stripes believe 
copyright should perform74—distinguishing what should protected and 
encouraged from what should or need not be.  Yet copyright as 
creativity law has become so all-encompassing that even skeptics of 
copyright‘s modern expansion have adopted it in the name of the 
Creative Commons movement and licensing scheme.75   
If creativity has exhausted itself conceptually, why turn to 
knowledge as a complement, if not a substitute?  History and tradition 
are useful starting points.  Copyright began as knowledge law,76 and 
knowledge law it should remain.  Congressional power to devise 
copyright and patent law remains tied to the goal of promoting 
―Progress of Science and the Useful Arts.‖77  History and tradition are 
also guides to copyright as knowledge law in normative terms.  Law 
and culture may have lurched toward creativity, but knowledge as a 
normative subject and object did not change.  The normative power of 
the thinking that went into the first copyright statutes, for example, 
remains undiminished.  In the words of George Washington: 
―Knowledge is in every country the surest basis of public happiness. In 
one in which the measures of government receive their impression so 
immediately from the sense of the community as in ours, it is 
proportionately essential.‖78 
Washington was making an instrumental claim about the 
relationship between knowledge and democratic self-government that 
echoes today both in the intuition that culture and governance are tied 
 
collecting and critiquing the artworks was ―transformatively different from the images‘ original 
expressive purpose‖); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less 
They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 251 
(1998).  
 73. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int‘l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009). The court 
rejected the proposition that derivative work copyrights are subject to a ―heightened originality‖ 
standard, usually associated with Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983), 
but preserved the proposition that derivative work copyrights subsist only in works that display 
a ―distinguishable variation‖ from their source. 
 74. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (describing prescriptions of Robert 
Merges and Neil Netanel). 
 75. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
 76. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 78. See Patterson & Birch, Jr., supra note 53, at 229-30 (quoting George Washington). 
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to one another and, more concretely, in Professor Netanel‘s work on 
the role of copyright in American democracy.79  The normative value of 
knowledge might be instrumental in an entirely different sense.  Even 
if knowledge were not tied specifically to self-governance, the 
Baconian tradition of experimental science aligned knowledge with 
improving the human condition, a premise that informs both modern 
copyright and patent law.80  As Professor William Fisher has explored 
in the context of the fair use doctrine, ethical claims tie knowledge (in 
Fisher‘s argument, framed as education) to a broad range of 
conceptions of the good life.81  The virtue of knowledge need not be 
instrumental.  Long-standing philosophical traditions lay claims to 
knowledge as a good in itself.82   
This argument does not rest solely on the claim that knowledge 
should be idealized as a good in itself; rather, it embraces the 
normative value of knowledge both as a good in itself and as 
something that can be shared and used.  The argument in total can be 
recast as the proposition that copyright should be informed by its 
status as knowledge law because individuals ought to be seeking 
knowledge for themselves and ought to be producing, distributing, 
sharing, storing, and conserving knowledge so that others can know.  
This ought includes knowledge of the self, knowledge of others, 
knowledge of the world, and, importantly, knowledge of things that 
are not yet known.83  Not all knowledge is good knowledge;84 
knowledge can cause harm, and  confidentiality and secrecy are valid 
normative goals under some circumstances.  At bottom, however, it is 
the case that copyright‘s historical resonance with knowledge has a 
normative basis that is independent of history and tradition. 
If copyright as creativity law offers a weak conceptual 
vocabulary for analyzing the issues that copyright has been tasked 
 
 79. See NETANEL, supra note 28, at 105-06 (building the promotion of knowledge into his 
model of copyright and the First Amendment). 
 80. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American 
Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11, 35 
(1998).  
 81. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1659, 1709-10 (1988). 
 82. See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2031-32 (2009) (describing the normative benefits of the knowledge 
embodied in mechanical inventions, whether or not they are commercialized).  
 83. In other words, the normative value of knowledge lies in what is unknown, and what 
society searches for, as much as it lies in what is known.  
 84. For an interesting analysis of the virtues of ignorance, see Christian Turner, The 
Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297 (2009). 
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with, and if copyright as knowledge law has a defensible historical 
basis and a strong normative foundation, then does copyright as 
knowledge law offer a strong conceptual vocabulary?  It has the 
potential to do so.  To make copyright work as a species of knowledge 
law, policymakers, judges, lawyers, and scholars—not to mention 
individuals, groups, and firms participating in activities that engage 
copyright questions—have to generate that vocabulary by exploring a 
range of conceptual issues and questions.  Knowledge, in other words, 
is difficult.85  The concept of knowledge both offers and requires 
answering a wide range of questions about how that concept should be 
translated into policy, doctrine, and practice.  Those questions include 
the following:  
The language of knowledge law: The dominant metaphor for intellectual property today 
is ownership.86  When and how can knowledge be owned?  By whom?  Why and how?  A 
related metaphorical issue surrounds the origins and destinations of intellectual 
property.  Where does knowledge come from, and how is it used?  Copyright as 
knowledge law may open a broader space for discussion and acceptance of the arguably 
cumulative and collective character of intellectual works.  The cumulative character of 
creativity is often justified rhetorically but inadequately with a reference to a quotation 
usually attributed to Isaac Newton: ―If I have seen further, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants.‖87  Both the quotation itself and its historical context refer not to 
creativity but to knowledge and scholarship.88   
The objects of knowledge law: Should the law be oriented to knowledge ―goods‖—that 
is, what copyright refers to as works of authorship?  Assuming that it should, how are 
knowledge goods defined?  Who defines them?  Should knowledge law preserve the 
law‘s current distinction between unprotectable abstract knowledge and protectable 
expression?  Between intangible knowledge and tangible objects?  All of these 
(tangible and intangible, idea and expression) are forms of knowledge.  What 
knowledge counts, and when?  Is there a more productive classification to be found 
among types of knowledge, such as distinctions among propositional knowledge 
(knowledge of what), prescriptive knowledge (knowledge of how), and knowledge of 
social facts and phenomena.89  What histories and contexts of knowledge matter?  
What is the relationship between creativity and knowledge, assuming that creativity 
should not be ejected or excluded from copyright, but re-established within it?  These 
 
 85. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 321 (2009) (focusing on the idea of an intellectual property as a right to exclude, 
independent of the regulatory context in which that right exists). 
 87. See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet 
Treaties, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2410 (2009).  
 88. The definitive account of the quotation and its pre-Newtonian origins is ROBERT K. 
MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (Univ. of Chi. Press 1993) 
(1965). The affinity of patent scholars for Newton is well-known. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 29 (1991). 
 89. See JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY 2-4 (2002). The categories demonstrate the possibility of constructing a meta-analysis 
of knowledge that keys into various intellectual property disciplines. These are not the only 
categories of knowledge or necessarily the right ones.  
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are questions that copyright as creativity law has tried to avoid.  Other areas of law 
and practice that traffic in knowledge of different types—evidence law, securities law, 
defamation law, and public funding of scientific research, for example—have 
developed ways to differentiate among types of knowledge.90  Should the law revisit 
its long-standing reluctance to distinguish between types of knowledge objects in the 
context of copyright, that is, the so-called non-discrimination principle, based on 
intrinsic attributes of different types of knowledge, or the purposes of different types 
of knowledge, or some other variables?91  How should appreciation for the purely 
aesthetic be situated in a legal vocabulary geared to knowledge?  (The impurely 
aesthetic, or crafts as well as arts, deserve notice as well.)  Art as knowledge, that is, 
as a way of knowing ourselves and the world, is a concept with a respectable historical 
pedigree; the concept is ripe for rehabilitation and elaboration in the context of 
intellectual property law.92 
Controlling and sharing knowledge: What are the rights and obligations of those who 
control knowledge and knowledge goods?  How might rights and obligations vary across 
different types of knowledge objects?  Across different types of individuals, groups, 
communities, and firms?  Should knowledge law more specifically and consistently 
address questions concerning social relationships constructed around knowledge, 
concerning access to knowledge, and concerning conservation and storage of knowledge 
and knowledge objects than intellectual property does today?  Some intellectual 
property scholars have begun efforts to investigate those questions,93 but they struggle 
against the paradigm of copyright as creativity law. 
Context: How should the law investigate the social, cultural, and material contexts, 
including institutional and other economic contexts and systems, in which knowledge is 
produced, stored, distributed, shared, accessed, and used?94  When and how should 
 
 90. Evidence law allows some knowledge to be considered by fact-finders, and it excludes 
other knowledge. Securities law regulates the types of knowledge that may be shared among 
buyers and sellers of securities. Defamation law punishes the public disclosure of certain kinds of 
knowledge. Governments fund the production of what it believes to be desirable scientific and 
artistic knowledge. For an interesting account of the relationships that law constructs among 
apparently disparate areas of what I call knowledge law, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996). 
 91. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 92.  See Carl H. Hamburg, Art as Knowledge, 12 COLLEGE ART J. 2 (1952); Harry Levin, 
Art as Knowledge, in HARRY LEVIN, CONTEXTS OF CRITICISM (1957), at 2; Henry P. Raleigh, Art 
as Communicable Knowledge, 5 J. AESTHETIC ED. 115 (1971); Ralph Ross, Art as Knowledge, 69 
SEWANEE REV. 579 (1961). 
 93. See Kapczynski, supra note 56, at 820; Menell, supra note 49, at 1018; Madhavi 
Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). On the challenges facing access movements as they 
confront authorship and creation narratives, see Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins 
and Access: A New Future for Intellectual Property, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
 94. Much of the contextual analysis that Professor Julie Cohen recommends with 
respect to copyrightable creativity belongs here, as applied to knowledge. See Cohen, supra note 
18. Institutional claims such as those raised by Professors Merges and Netanel, see supra notes 
27-28 and accompanying text, can be assessed here as well. Professor Beebe answers his own 
critique of the cultural hierarchies produced by intellectual property law by pointing to the 
redemptive possibilities in what Professors Brett Frischmann, Katherine Strandburg, and I have 
called commons in the cultural environment. See Beebe, supra note 15, at 994-87; Michael J. 
Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010). Professor Madhavi Sunder has rightly 
urged reconsideration of questions of wealth, power, and status in the context of intellectual 
property law generally, as part of an overall appreciation of the social relationships that property 
law builds, and is built upon. See Sunder, supra note 93, at 315-19.  
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information about context inform conclusions drawn as to knowledge law issues 
concerning access and control, and individual and communal or collective interests? 
Integrating disparate intellectual property doctrines: Could constructing a vocabulary of 
copyright as knowledge law offer the potential to connect copyright doctrines more 
thoughtfully to other intellectual property doctrines and related domains than is 
typically possible today?  Copyright as creativity law appears to have little to do with 
patent law or trademark law, or with questions of privacy, public health, or traditional 
knowledge (TK) and traditional cultural expression (TCE).  Patent law, in particular, is 
often characterized as the law of useful knowledge, and, as a result, it wrestles with its 
own subject matter demons.95  These fields all may be related as species of knowledge 
law.  A richer, common vocabulary might help policymakers make better sense of 
overlaps and inconsistencies.   
That is a non-exclusive list, and it lacks detail.96  It is certainly 
possible that these questions and issues might be raised in copyright 
contexts and that the flow of scholarship, policymaking, and litigation 
would produce a thin conceptual vocabulary that is no better than 
what exists today.  But it is difficult to imagine that such a vocabulary 
would be worse, and given the freshness of the amateur art and digital 
production issues noted in the Introduction, the time seems right to 
explore the possibility. 
The next two Parts initiate some of that exploration, taking 
some of these broad ideas and making them more concrete.  Part II 
looks backward, taking up an older example of artistic borrowing that 
offers an echo of the Associated Press‘s contemporary claim against 
Shepard Fairey.  The point of this example is that the connection 
between amateur art and digital production is new, but it has 
precedent in the history of art, and precedent that speaks to the 
broader discussion of creativity and knowledge.  A transition from 
copyright as creativity law to copyright as knowledge law need not 
represent a sudden departure from copyright‘s past—even its 
nineteenth century ―romantic authorship‖ past.  That past offers some 
potentially productive ways of looking at a knowledge future.  Part III 
looks at recent cases, suggesting that copyright as knowledge law may 
offer some immediate and tangible benefits in the context of current 
disputes. 
II. FROM CREATIVITY TO KNOWLEDGE 
It is hardly satisfying to claim that copyright could be 
conceptualized as a species of knowledge law and conclude by 
 
 95. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 
1141 (1999).  
 96. For more detailed justifications of inquiries into several of these issues, see Madison, 
Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, supra note 30, at 2040. 
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identifying questions, rather than answers, with respect to what that 
might mean in practice.  In this Part and the next, I offer some 
examples from history and current experience, returning to the 
questions of amateur art and digital production.  How does copyright 
as knowledge law contribute to a better understanding of those issues? 
For a historical example, consider the Dutch painter Vincent 
van Gogh.  As one of the great painters of the nineteenth century, van 
Gogh is sometimes cited as the model of the romantic author that 
many scholars argue shaped copyright law over the last one hundred 
years, a mostly solitary artistic genius who was inspired to create by 
the glories of nature rather than the prospect of financial reward.97  
Van Gogh succeeded in producing a body of supremely creative work,98 
even if the paintings themselves sold badly until van Gogh was 
discovered posthumously.  The Starry Night, painted in 1889, 
exemplifies this theme; it is associated with van Gogh‘s direct, 
emotional, and highly imaginative sense of nature.  Van Gogh‘s letters 
to his brother Theo offer the artist‘s own insights into his work:  
[T]he sight of the stars always makes me dream in as simple a way as the black spots 
on the map, representing towns and villages, make me dream.  [¶] Why, I say to 
myself, should the spots of light in the firmament be less accessible to us than the 
black spots on the map of France.99 
It may be surprising to many legal scholars, therefore, to learn 
that van Gogh was a copyist, and a repeated and intentional copyist at 
that, even during his later years, when he produced The Starry Night, 
as well as other works that are now regarded as Expressionist 
masterpieces.  Some intellectual property scholars have noted one 
particular feature of van Gogh‘s experience as a copyist: his reworking 
in oils of Japanese woodcut prints by Utagawa Hiroshige.100  The 
lawyer and scholar Paul Geller, weaving van Gogh‘s borrowing from 
 
 97. See BOYLE, supra note 90, at 91-92. 
 98. Arthur Koestler famously wrote that ―Einstein's space is no closer to reality than 
Van Gogh's sky‖ as a way of expressing the sense that scientists and artists are alike in their use 
and exploration of the human imagination. ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 252 
(1964). 
 99. Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Arles (Monday, July 9 or Tuesday, 
July 10, 1888), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS (Leo Jansen, Hans Luijten & Nienke Bakker 
eds., 2009), available at http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let638/letter.html. The original of 
The Starry Night is in the collection of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, which makes 
the connection between the quotation in the text and this painting at Museum of Modern Art, 
Vincent van Gogh, The Starry Night, http://www.moma.org/collection/browse_results.php?object_ 
id=79802 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
 100. See Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for Change, 55 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 165, 180 (2008); Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige v. Van Gogh: Resolving 
the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y U.S.A. 39, 
40 (1998). 
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Hiroshige into a discussion of the scope of copyright claims, notes that 
van Gogh‘s studies of Hiroshige were unambiguously and creatively 
new: ―From one‘s prints to the other‘s studies, composition goes from 
static to dynamic, coloration from muted to emphatic, and emotional 
tone changes altogether.‖101 
I focus on a less-noted part of van Gogh‘s experience—his 
copying of paintings by the French Realist Jean-François Millet—and 
on how van Gogh himself described the process and the meaning of 
what he was doing.  In van Gogh‘s words, a modern scholar may hear 
echoes of a creative imagination at work, but van Gogh himself may 
have thought that he was up to something else—something closer to 
what I mean by offering as a copyright theme, and something that 
may be helpful in considering amateur and digital art. 
Millet himself was a celebrated and successful painter of the 
mid-nineteenth century who was (and remains) well-known for his 
true-to-life portraits of peasant life.102  Millet painted oils, he drew, 
and he produced woodcuts.  Van Gogh, working twenty to thirty years 
after Millet, copied his paintings and prints, over and over again.  
Between 1889 and 1890, during van Gogh‘s residence in Saint-Rémy 
and around the same time that van Gogh painted The Starry Night, he 
produced more than twenty paintings of countryside and peasant 
scenes which he titled, in part, ―After Millet‖103—that is, which 
continued both van Gogh‘s long-standing fascination with Millet, and 
the Realism found in van Gogh‘s earliest works.   
What was van Gogh doing?  Primarily, van Gogh‘s paintings 
were studies.104  Van Gogh‘s paintings are not reproductions of Millet‘s 
paintings and prints, but, unlike his studies of Hiroshige, they are not 
adaptations of one genre into another.  Millet was a Realist; van Gogh 
emulated his Realism.  Subject, composition, tone, and coloration vary 
between the two artists, but sometimes subtly.  (Some of Millet works 
 
 101. See Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis, supra note 100, at 180-81. Geller does not 
hold himself out as an art critic, so his judgments should be taken as useful anecdotes. I have 
seen van Gogh‘s studies and Hiroshige‘s prints side by side. While van Gogh clearly was engaged 
in reworking, and his paintings are not copies of Hiroshige‘s prints, my own anecdotal reaction is 
that it is difficult to say that van Gogh projects a dynamism, emotional tone, and sense of color 
that is more impressive than that of Hiroshige. Once we set aside a subconscious sense that van 
Gogh was a magnificent and original creator, my own sense is that van Gogh‘s studies are 
neither more nor less creative than Hiroshige‘s prints.  
 102. See ALEXANDRA R. MURPHY ET AL., JEAN-FRANÇOIS MILLET: DRAWN INTO THE LIGHT 
1 (1999). 
 103. A helpful inventory of van Gogh‘s studies of Millet, with links to images of both 
Millet‘s and van Gogh‘s paintings, is available at Vincent van Gogh: Influences, 
http://www.vggallery.com/influences/millet/main.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
 104. See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text. 
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that van Gogh copied were prints, in black and white; some of the 
Millet works were paintings.)  Some of van Gogh‘s studies vividly 
evoke the Expressionism on display in The Starry Night; some less 
so.105  It is tempting to characterize van Gogh‘s use of Millet as Geller 
characterizes van Gogh‘s use of Hiroshige, as a modern artist bringing 
an older reference to life.  That argument is seeded with notions of 
creativity.  Van Gogh was creating.  He was also, and more 
importantly, practicing.  In his own words, he was learning, and he 
was teaching. 
Excerpts from van Gogh‘s contemporaneous letters to his 
brother Theo are revealing:  
What you say about the copy after Millet, The evening, pleases me.  The more I think 
about it the more I find that there‘s justification for trying to reproduce things by Millet 
that he didn‘t have the time to paint in oils.  So working either on his drawings or the 
wood engravings, it‘s not copying pure and simple that one would be doing.  It is rather 
translating into another language, the one of colours, the impressions of chiaroscuro and 
white and black.  In this way I‘ve just finished the three other ‗times of the day‘ after the 
wood engravings by Lavielle.  It took me a lot of time and a lot of trouble. . . .  
[O]nce you have them you‘ll clearly see that they were done through a most profound 
and sincere admiration for Millet.  Then, even if they‘re criticized one day or despised as 
copies, it will remain no less true that it‘s justifiable to try to make Millet‘s work more 
accessible to the ordinary general public. . .  .  
This week I‘m going to start on Millet‘s ‗Snow-covered field‘ and ‗First steps‘ in the same 
format as the others.  Then there‘ll be 6 canvases forming a series, and I assure you that 
I‘ve worked on them, these last three of the ‗Times of the day‘, with much thought to 
calculate the colour. 
You see, these days there are so many people who don‘t feel made for the public but who 
support and consolidate what others do.  Those who translate books, for example.  The 
engravers, the lithographers.  Take Vernier, for example, and Lerat.  So that‘s to say 
that I don‘t hesitate to make copies.  If I had the leisure to travel, how I‘d like to copy 
the works of Giotto, this painter who would be as modern as Delacroix if he weren‘t 
primitive, and who‘s so different from the other primitives.  I haven‘t seen much of his 
work, though.  But there‘s one who is consolatory.106 
And in another letter to Theo: 
I can assure you that it interests me enormously to make copies, and that not having 
any models for the moment it will ensure, however, that I don‘t lose sight of the figure. 
What‘s more, it will give me a studio decoration for myself or another. 
I would like also to copy the Sower and the Diggers.   
 
 105. The characterizations of van Gogh, Millet, and Hiroshige in this paragraph are 
based on my own viewing of original works at the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam in October 
2009. 
 106. Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Saint-Rémy-de-Provence (on or 
about Monday, Jan. 13, 1890), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS, supra note 99, available at 
http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let839/letter.html. 
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There‘s a photo of the Diggers after the drawing.   
And Lerat‘s etching of the Sower at Durand-Ruel‘s.   
In these same etchings is the Field under the snow with a harrow.  Then The four times 
of the day, there are examples of them in the collection of wood engravings.  
I would like to have all of this, at least the etchings and the wood engravings. It‘s a 
study I need, for I want to learn.  Although copying may be the old system, that 
absolutely doesn‘t bother me at all. I‘m going to copy Delacroix‘s Good Samaritan 
too. . . . 
What I‘m seeking in it, and why it seems good to me to copy them, I‘m going to try to tell 
you. We painters are always asked to compose ourselves and to be nothing but 
composers. 
Very well—but in music it isn‘t so—and if such a person plays some  Beethoven he‘ll add 
his personal interpretation to it—in music, and then above all for singing—a composer‘s 
interpretation is something, and it isn‘t a hard and fast rule that only the composer 
plays his own compositions. 
Good—since I‘m above all ill at present, I‘m trying to do something to console myself, for 
my own pleasure. 
I place the black-and-white by Delacroix or Millet or after them in front of me as a 
subject.  And then I improvise colour on it but, being me, not completely of course, but 
seeking memories of their paintings—but the memory, the vague consonance of colours 
that are in the same sentiment, if not right—that‘s my own interpretation. 
Heaps of people don‘t copy. Heaps of others do copy—for me, I set myself to it by chance, 
and I find that it teaches and above all sometimes consoles.107 
And finally: 
One must—it is true—believe in it a little from time to time in order to see it.  If, for 
myself, I wanted to continue, let‘s call it TRANSLATING certain pages of Millet, then in 
order to prevent people, not criticizing me, I couldn‘t care about that, but bothering or 
obstructing me under the pretext that I‘m manufacturing copies—then among the 
artists I need people like Russell or Gauguin to carry this task to a successful 
conclusion, to make something serious of it.  To do the things by Millet that you sent, for 
example, the choice of which I consider completely right—I have scruples of conscience, 
and I took the pile of photographs and I sent them unhesitatingly to Russell so that I 
shouldn‘t see them again until I‘d thought long and hard about it.  I don‘t want to do it 
before first having heard something of your opinion, then also that of certain others on 
those that you‘ll soon receive.  Without that I‘d have scruples of conscience, a fear that it 
might be plagiarism.108 
In light of this evidence, it is tempting to set a hypothetical 
claim by Millet against van Gogh, and by van Gogh against a 
downstream copyist, in the context of modern copyright law.  Did van 
 
 107. Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Saint-Rémy-de-Provence (on or 
about Friday, Sept. 20, 1889), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS, supra note 99, available at 
http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let805/letter.html. 
 108. Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Saint-Rémy-de-Provence 
(Saturday, Feb. 1, 1890), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS, supra note 99, available at 
http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let850/letter.html. 
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Gogh infringe Millet?  (Precisely, would van Gogh‘s work have 
infringed Millet‘s hypothetical copyrights?)  Is van Gogh‘s work 
excused under the rubric of fair use?  Has van Gogh produced versions 
of Millet that are sufficiently original that they may be protected by 
copyright as derivative works?  My view is that the answers to these 
questions are ―no,‖ ―yes,‖ and ―yes,‖ respectively, but, as is often the 
case, reasonable minds may differ.  In the late nineteenth century, 
Millet was better known than van Gogh, and van Gogh‘s early 
Expressionism had not yet found a critical audience.109  Had van Gogh 
been more successful in marketing his work, including his copies of 
Millet, contemporary judgment (again, if modern copyright standards 
were applied) might well have favored Millet, the creator, against van 
Gogh, the copyist.  Even a modern assessment does not clearly favor 
van Gogh, though the twentieth century has been especially kind to 
van Gogh the creator.  If van Gogh were to prevail in modern terms, 
and possess a valid copyright in his own work, the route to that result 
would run through copyright as creativity law.  The excerpt above 
from Paul Geller‘s article, commenting on the relative creativity 
observed in the work of van Gogh and Hiroshige,110 is representative 
of that argument.   
Van Gogh‘s own epistolary testimony suggests a somewhat 
different and perhaps clearer route to vindicating van Gogh and to 
understanding what he was doing—one that sounds, or at least 
echoes, in copyright as knowledge law.  It is possible to extract several 
important points from the long quotations above. 
The first point is that van Gogh himself may not have 
conceived of his work as part of what has become known as the 
authorship movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
There is no doubt that self-expression was among van Gogh‘s highest 
priorities, yet there is a conspicuous absence of the philosophy, 
grounded in literature, that characterized the author‘s work as a 
distinct intangible thing deserving of legal protection.111  Van Gogh 
was hardly ignorant of artists‘ ethical interests; he went to some 
lengths to distinguish his efforts from those of a copyist, or a 
 
 109. Art historians studying van Gogh‘s copies of Millet appear united in their judgment 
that van Gogh was both self-conscious and innovative in his use of Millet, well-known as an 
artist, both for his own training, and for the purpose of eventually bringing his own paintings to 
a popular audience. See generally CHARLES CHETHAM, THE ROLE OF VINCENT VAN GOGH‘S COPIES 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS ART (1976); CORNELIA HOMBURG, THE COPY TURNS ORIGINAL: 
VINCENT VAN GOGH AND A NEW APPROACH TO TRADITIONAL ART PRACTICE (1996); see DEBORA 
SILVERMAN, VAN GOGH AND GAUGUIN: THE SEARCH FOR SACRED ART 395-399 (2004).  
 110. See Geller, Hiroshige v. Van Gogh, supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Woodmansee, supra note 57, at 444-47. 
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plagiarist.112  Van Gogh regarded himself, after all, as an artist.113  He 
did not idealize or romanticize what was happening.  He was 
practicing, and training, as artists do. 
The second point is that van Gogh focused simultaneously on 
himself as an artist, and on his audience.  Van Gogh was not 
commercially successful during his lifetime, but that does not mean 
that he was indifferent to (and did not paint in anticipation of) making 
money from his work or having his work seen and understood.  Note 
the references in his letters to his use of Millet in the context of 
studying, learning, and teaching.114  These are extensions of a broader 
knowledge metaphor: van Gogh was seeking knowledge for himself, 
and he was conscious of extending his knowledge to others.  If his 
words are taken at face value, then van Gogh regarded himself 
unmistakably as an artist, but his was not art for art‘s sake, nor 
creativity for creativity‘s sake.  The bridge between van Gogh‘s 
teaching himself and his teaching others is his self-conscious use of 
the translation metaphor (another derivative of a broader knowledge 
metaphor), and use of that metaphor in a field-specific or discipline-
specific way—as applicable to painters, composers, and those who 
express art in different media: engravers, lithographers, and so on.  
One might say that van Gogh regarded himself as the professional 
teacher, and the ―ordinary general public‖115 as his students. 
One cannot say that this evidence alone would be enough to 
excuse van Gogh‘s work as fair use, or to assure that van Gogh‘s work 
would be entitled to copyright protection in its own right.  A party‘s 
testimony concerning the character of his own work may be suspect 
for a variety of good reasons, even if reasons to doubt van Gogh‘s 
sincerity are not apparent here.  Other considerations inform 
copyright judgments, even within the creativity construct.  Yet a 
knowledge law framework seems more persuasive than a creativity 
law framework in figuring out how this case should be resolved.  Van 
Gogh‘s letters lay out a multi-part matrix for assessing the legitimacy 
of what van Gogh was doing—a ―what‖ (a translation of prior work), a 
―who‖ (a professional artist), a ―how‖ (interpreting what others 
produced and teaching it anew), and a ―where‖ (an institutional 
 
 112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (quoting letter dated Feb. 1, 1890). 
 113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (quoting letter dated on or about Sept. 20, 
1889). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (quoting letter dated Jan. 13, 1890). In 
the original, this is ―grand public ordinaire,‖ which has been translated by some as ―great 
general public.‖ 
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context)—that is not foreign to how contemporary scholars look at 
creativity questions and that explicitly and easily maps on to a 
knowledge framework.116  One might plausibly and persuasively argue 
that van Gogh‘s work that ―translates‖ Millet (to use van Gogh‘s 
metaphor) is noninfringing and copyrightable, at least in this 
hypothetical dispute, precisely because the evidence shows that it 
suits that matrix.   
At the end of Part I above, I offered a series of questions and 
issues that policymakers, courts, and scholars may use to develop a 
conceptual vocabulary that builds out the meaning of copyright as 
knowledge law.  More than one hundred years ago, Vincent van Gogh 
was engaged in a version of that same exercise.  A shift from copyright 
as creativity law to copyright as knowledge law is not only historically 
justified and normatively desirable.  It is accessible even within the 
authorship-enabled discourse of contemporary copyright in which 
scholars have situated van Gogh. 
III. CREATION, RE-USE, ACCESS, AND DISTRIBUTION AS KNOWLEDGE 
LAW 
Van Gogh and Millet are ancestors of Shepard Fairey and the 
Associated Press, not in the sense that Fairey is entitled to van Gogh‘s 
stature as an artist (or that the Associated Press is entitled to 
Millet‘s), but instead in the sense that the conceptual relationship 
between the two is structured in the same way.  Van Gogh was 
concerned that he would be regarded as a mere copyist with respect to 
an artist of recognized stature, who van Gogh admired.  Fairey is 
accused of being a mere copyist with respect to a source that is 
plausibly artistic.   
This pattern is not new.  Appropriation artists and conceptual 
artists have been framing these issues for decades.117  Software 
 
 116. As that matrix is constructed from van Gogh‘s letters, a theme emerges—multiple 
and overlapping flows of knowledge from sources to destinations—that echoes a similar theme in 
modern psychological and sociological studies of creativity and innovation contexts. See generally 
CSÍKSZENTMIHÁLYI, supra note 34; JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF 
INFORMATION 304 (2000) (describing ―ecologies‖ of innovation and innovation in firms). 
 117. To some observers, Shepard Fairey may not be even a conceptual artist; he is, or at 
least appears to be, a half-step removed from anyone equipped with a laptop computer and a 
copy of Photoshop. He is not van Gogh because he is everyone, or anyone. To those critics, he is 
not even Jeff Koons (an artist who is subject to his own share of skepticism), who has at times 
been highly conscious of the ―what is the same‖ and ―what is different‖ basis of discipline-based 
art. Because he uses digital tools that are broadly available and because he produces work that, 
in the eyes of some, could be produced by anyone, Fairey appears to be attitude, rather than 
meaning; he appears to be the spectre of amateur art. What happens if every person is a 
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developers face comparable questions when they engage in verbatim 
copying of copyrighted computer programs in order to build 
interoperable programs.118  What has changed is the frequency with 
which the legal system (and others) encounter the pattern, given the 
rise of cheap digital technology and its widespread use, and the decay 
of the conceptual vocabulary that the law has evolved to deal with the 
pattern in light of technology and practice.  The previous Part 
suggested that copyright as knowledge law offers a useful rubric for 
evaluating van Gogh‘s defense against a hypothetical claim by Millet.  
What might that rubric teach regarding Shepard Fairey, and 
regarding amateurs who cannot claim even Fairey‘s stature as an 
artist, let alone van Gogh‘s?119   
The knowledge law construct teaches not to emphasize the 
distinction between professional and amateur art or artists, as such, 
and not to favor not-for-profit knowledge contexts over for-profit 
knowledge contexts (or the reverse) solely on the principle that 
commercializing and commodifying art is a bad (or good) thing.  It 
teaches that creativity claims are not unimportant but may need to be 
appreciated alongside other substantive claims regarding the ―what?‖ 
that copyright should value.  The personal vision of an author or 
creator, and the response of a reader or audience, may be best seen as 
part of a flow of meaning embedded in various intangible and tangible 
forms, including objects, rhetorics, and social and business practices.  
In many fields, subject matter favored by outsiders, amateurs, and 
hobbyists evolves into new domains of professionalism.  In the 
twentieth century, rock ‗n‘ roll music120 and Pop Art121 are two of the 
better known domains of professional creativity with roots in outsider 
or marginal artistic practice. 
All of that is preliminary and tentative, and while Shepard 
Fairey‘s work offers a timely opportunity to engage this conversation 
 
potential Koons or Fairey? Or—more plausibly—what happens if we (courts, intermediaries, 
audiences, and new artists) can no longer tell the difference? The answer may be that the 
difference no longer matters. But lines still need to be drawn; choices need to be made.  
 118. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1608 (2002). 
 119. What might it make of service providers and technology developers who facilitate 
their activities? Though the question is beyond the scope of this Article, copyright as knowledge 
law holds interesting possibilities for assessing copyright interests of Internet service providers 
and hosts, libraries, archives, indexers, and search engines. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 120. See PIERO SCARUFFI, A HISTORY OF ROCK MUSIC: 1951-2000 (2003). 
 121. See MARCO LIVINGSTONE, POP ART: A CONTINUING HISTORY (1990). 
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between law and culture,122 this Article is not necessarily the best 
place to conclude it, or even to continue it very far.  At the time of this 
writing, the Fairey litigation is still pending, and its disclosed record 
is incomplete.   
Even if the plaintiff‘s photograph contains copyrightable 
elements, Fairey‘s work should be viewed as a form of fair use.  Fairey 
has created an entirely new subject and object of knowledge—Obama 
as a subject of mythos (for his supporters), and an object of ridicule 
(for his opponents).123  In art world terms, Fairey is practicing in a 
tradition of art based on found material that extends from Duchamp 
to Warhol, Koons, and Hirst.124  In doctrinal terms, as a species of 
knowledge law, Fairey‘s case is perhaps closest to Gaylord v. United 
States,125 in which the owner of a copyright in a public sculpture sued 
the United States Postal Service for using an image of the sculpture 
on a stamp.  The Court of Federal Claims found that the use 
constituted a noninfringing fair use, in large part because the Postal 
Service, having used a photograph of the statue that included some 
snow-covering and having engraved the image in order to produce the 
stamp, ―changed Mr. Gaylord‘s sculpture to create a new, surrealistic 
vision.‖126  There is a hint in that phrase of a flow of meaning, of ways 
of knowing the world, among the sculptor (Gaylord), the 
intermediaries (the photographer, the Postal Service), and the 
ultimate audience (stamp users).127  Fairey seems to offer a claim that 
resembles this argument, facilitating a flow of ways of knowing the 
world, with respect to then-Senator Obama and his supporters and 
critics.  It is difficult to say more at this stage, either with respect to 
 
 122. The conversational metaphor is borrowed from Peter Jaszi. Peter Jaszi, See Is There 
Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 106 (2009). 
 123. That statement encompasses not only Fairey‘s perspective, and that of his intended 
audience, but also the perspective of an objective observer. Which of these is relevant, and when, 
is something that a knowledge critique of copyright would have to work out. 
 124. Jeff Koons‘s use of found material in his own art has been the subject two well-
known and widely-discussed opinions of the Second Circuit, the first finding that Koons‘s work 
infringed, the second finding that it constituted fair use. Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 
(2d Cir. 1992) (finding that Koons‘s ―String of Puppies‖ sculpture infringed Art Rogers‘s 
copyright in his photograph ―Puppies‖), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding that Koons engaged in fair use when incorporating a portion of Andrea Branch‘s 
photograph of a woman‘s legs into a larger collage). Peter Jaszi suggests that different 
treatments of Koons may reflect evolving cultural understandings of conceptual art. See Jaszi, 
supra note 122, at 116-17. 
 125. 85 Fed. Cl. 59 (2008), aff‘d in part, rev‘d in part, and remanded, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 126. Id. at 69. 
 127. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (raising the question of art as knowledge 
in the context of copyright as knowledge law). 
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Fairey‘s claim or with respect to the vision of fair use at which the 
lower court in Gaylord hinted.  To the extent that court spoke 
indirectly in terms of copyright as knowledge law, it offered little 
guidance to lawyers, scholars, future judges, and least of all 
individuals, groups, and firms regarding how to express the fair use of 
knowledge (or the absence of fair use) in terms of legal rhetoric.  A 
more evolved doctrine of fair use as part of knowledge law would 
articulate in more detail the types of evidence that would be relevant 
in establishing or rejecting the application of the doctrine—the 
sources, practices, communities, and attributes of meaning that would 
supplement the law‘s current focus on the plaintiff‘s and defendant‘s 
works and their markets.  Without that pragmatic detail, copyright as 
knowledge law runs a risk of being as conclusory and unhelpful in 
practice as copyright as creativity law.128   
Fair use cases are obvious candidates for re-examination under 
copyright as knowledge law.  A more challenging and interesting 
example is Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.,129 in which 
exact reproductions of public domain paintings, marketed as 
transparencies and CD-ROMs, were held not to be copyrightable in a 
case brought against a commercial copyist.  The court concluded that 
the plaintiff‘s works did not manifest the requisite originality as 
derivative works, because there was no evident distinguishable 
variation between the source and the reproductions:  
In this case, plaintiff by its own admission had labored to create ―slavish copies‖ of 
public domain works of art.  While it may be assumed that this required both skill and 
effort, there was no spark of originality—indeed, the point of the exercise was to 
reproduce the underlying works with absolute fidelity.130   
The plaintiff‘s reproductions were, in effect, so good that they reflected 
supreme technical skill, but no creativity. 
Bridgeman has been the subject of extensive commentary, the 
best of which has expressed strong sympathy for all of the multiple 
 
 128. The fragility of a thin conception of copyright as knowledge law is illustrated by the 
opinion of the Federal Circuit in Gaylord. The Court of Appeals specifically rejected the lower 
court‘s finding that the stamp produced a distinct surrealistic character. In the court‘s words, 
―[c]apturing The Column on a cold morning after a snowstorm--rather than on a warm sunny 
day--does not transform its character, meaning, or message. Nature's decision to snow cannot 
deprive Mr. Gaylord of an otherwise valid right to exclude.‖ Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 
1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010). That quotation speaks in terms of copyright as creativity law. To 
recast the court‘s judgment slightly, the defendant had not demonstrated the presence of 
creativity in its work that was sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff‘s property right in his own 
creativity.  
 129. 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Bridgeman I]. 
 130. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
[hereinafter Bridgeman II]. 
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interests at stake: museums and other art historical institutions that 
have both commercial and scholarly interests at stake in producing 
and distributing art reproductions, and scholars and the public who 
ought not to have access to public domain works foreclosed because of 
modern copyrights claimed in exact reproductions.131  Whether or not 
the outcome is defensible on the merits, its rhetoric and 
argumentative structure are discomforting.  The rejection of ―slavish 
copying‖ as a basis for a copyright claim has support in precedent.  
The reference stems in part from the rejection of a claimed copyright 
on that ground in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder132—but is both oddly 
moralistic and inconsistent with credible artistic interests.133  Would 
framing the case in terms of copyright as knowledge law lead to a 
more plausible and persuasive result, if not necessarily a different 
one? 
Bridgeman, as the court presented it, unfolded as follows.  The 
plaintiff began with two-dimensional works of fine art: paintings, 
which were in the public domain.134  Despite their public domain 
status, copyright law commands a conceptual distinction of intangible 
idea from intangible expression in each of those paintings.  The latter 
constitutes the creativity produced by the painting‘s author.  By 
creating high-quality reproductions of the paintings, Bridgeman 
copied that intangible expression verbatim.  The author‘s creativity 
was entirely unchanged in the move from canvas to photograph and 
CD-ROM.  The change of medium made no creative difference.  As the 
court noted, ―production of a work of art in a different medium cannot 
by itself constitute the originality required for copyright protection.‖135  
That proposition is consistent with a bedrock copyright concept, that 
the copyright exists independent of any material form in which the 
 
 131. See R. Anthony Reese, Photographs of Public Domain Paintings: How, if at All, 
Should We Protect Them?, 34 J. CORP. L. 1033 (2009) (proposing a limited sui generis property 
right applicable to art reproductions, but expressing skepticism that such a right would pass 
constitutional muster). 
 132. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 133. The moralistic tone carried by the phrase ―slavish copying‖ is no accident. The first 
reported use of the phrase took place in a district court opinion that granted an injunction on 
unfair competition grounds against the producer of a ―return post card folder‖ that copied an 
identical product originated by the plaintiff. See Correct Printing Co. v. Ramapo River Printing 
Co., 16 F. Supp. 573, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).  
 134. Presumably, most, if not all, of these painting were never protected by copyright in 
the first place. The plaintiff relied in part on a certificate of registration in a work collecting its 
digital images entitled Old World Masters I. Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
 135. Bridgeman II, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (quoting Past Pluto Prods. v. Dana, 627 F. 
Supp. 1435, 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
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work is fixed.136  With no creativity, there was no originality; with no 
originality, there was no copyright.   
How might this be reframed?  Begin with the original work of 
authorship, which, implicitly, is unchanged in the transition from one 
medium to another.  It is characteristically assumed by copyright 
lawyers and scholars and by judges in copyright cases that this work 
of authorship is entirely intangible, though specific support for that 
assumption appears neither in the Copyright Act nor in the United 
States Constitution.137  Copyright law does not define the concept of 
the work of authorship.138  It is, in fact, largely a product of the 
authorship development of the nineteenth century,139 meaning that its 
current role in copyright analysis is at most statutory, rather than 
constitutional.  A work of authorship is embodied in material objects 
called copies, which leads to the conclusion that works of authorship 
are intangible and copies are tangible.  Yet, there is no logical 
inconsistency between the idea of a tangible work of authorship, that 
is, a work that the author or creator has created with the hand rather 
the head, and a copy that embodies that work.  Even the definition of 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, which appears to require 
separating intangible expressive features of three-dimensional and 
two-dimensional graphical works from their physical forms, does not 
exclude the possibility of tangible works of authorship.140 
Treat the original paintings as knowledge objects.  Adopt some 
of the sense of van Gogh‘s reference to teaching and learning through 
his art as well as the premise that knowledge itself is embodied in 
tangible as well as intangible things.141  Does transferring those 
paintings into different media, in order to effect their publication and 
distribution (and commercialization) to new or different audiences, 
advance a related teaching and learning goal?  It might be argued that 
 
 136. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (―Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is 
embodied.‖). 
 137. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit 
Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2009) (―Intangibles like works of authorship can be 
extensively shared without damage to the owners, which is not as true of tangibles.‖). 
 138. That omission is the source of growing anxiety among scholars. See Justin Hughes, 
Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 576 (2005). 
 139. See Woodmansee, supra note 57. On the development of the concept of the ―work of 
authorship‖ in the nineteenth century as the locus of copyright analysis, see Bracha, supra note 
22.  
 140. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―‗Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works‘ . . . . shall 
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects are concerned.‖). 
 141. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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such a change of medium does precisely that; if so, the conclusion 
would follow that there is copyrightable originality in Bridgeman‘s 
transparencies.  That conclusion would require rolling back not only 
the rejection of the ―slavish copying‖ principle cited in Bridgeman, 
with its evocation of the idea that ―slavish‖ copying is inherently 
value-less, but also the dictum in Feist that originality consists of a 
form of creativity.  A less dramatic turn would take that argument to 
the same conclusion that the district court reached in Bridgeman: that 
Bridgeman owns no protectable copyright interest in its 
transparencies.  The judgment might rest not on the proposition that 
there is no creativity evident in the transparencies, and instead might 
rest on the proposition that the process of producing the 
transparencies evidences valuable knowledge that belongs not in the 
copyright system but perhaps—given its technical character—in the 
patent system.  Looking at Bridgeman as a case of knowledge law 
could align it, in other words, with cases such as Baker v. Selden.142  
Selden‘s bookkeeping text was held to be uncopyrightable subject 
matter, but Selden‘s bookkeeping method, the Supreme Court noted, 
might have been entitled to a patent.143  That conclusion would have 
the added benefit of assuring Bridgeman and other producers of art 
reproductions a return sufficient to justify their investment in this 
product. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
I have argued that copyright is dominated by a conceptual 
construct, copyright as creativity law, which has exhausted whatever 
ability it may have had to supply lawyers and policymakers with a 
vocabulary adequate to differentiate persuasively between the kinds of 
things that copyright law should value and those things that copyright 
law should not.  This challenge is particularly evident in the context of 
amateur art.  Amateur creators are authors in copyright terms; they 
are also users and consumers.  The vocabulary of creativity limits the 
ability of the copyright system to differentiate between plausible 
claims of fair use and ordinary consumption, for example, and between 
copyrightable and uncopyrightable production of new works.  Scholars 
have sought to refine creativity in copyright in a variety of ways.  This 
 
 142. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 143. See id. at 103. The status of related, modern business method patents is under 
review by the Supreme Court. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (limiting 
scope of patentable subject matter in the business method context), petition for cert. granted sub. 
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).  
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has offered a supplemental construct, copyright as knowledge law, 
which offers a historically valid and normatively justifiable route to 
developing and supplying a better vocabulary altogether.  
Surprisingly, at least some support for the proposal is found in the 
writings of Vincent van Gogh, who is widely regarded as the kind of 
creative genius to whom the system‘s creativity construct is 
addressed.144 
Copyright as knowledge law offers risks and costs as well as 
potential benefits.  Is it feasible to adapt copyright as knowledge law?  
Constitutional law might pose an obstacle.  Feist puts originality front 
and center in copyright law as a matter of constitutional law.  As a 
result of that case, it is difficult to conceive of originality expressed in 
terms of knowledge rather than in terms of creativity.  Yet the 
constitutional provision that supports copyright law also supports 
patent law,145 and the latter is unambiguously a knowledge-driven 
body of law.  So long as the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution is read as an integrated statement, a reading that is 
justifiable based on the most recent research into its origins,146 the 
Constitution should be no obstacle to my claim here.  Artists and 
artistic communities whose identities, discourses, and practices 
depend heavily on explicit ideologies of creativity would face the 
challenging (though hardly insuperable) task of articulating those 
ideologies in terms of knowledge; lawyers, judges, and policymakers 
who are engaged with those communities would face the same task.  
At the same time, the existence of that challenge implies that there 
should be an opportunity to disengage creativity from copyright.  
Some scholars now argue that the breadth of creative practice 
demands precisely such a careful approach to copyright law.147  Would 
relying on copyright as knowledge law pose a threat of inscribing a 
hierarchy of expression and information that would undermine, rather 
than enhance, the normative benefits of knowledge?  Perhaps. 
Yet my argument does not require a return to an older, 
hierarchical system.  Nor do I suggest that ―everyman‖ or 
―everywoman‖ or ―collaboratives‖ and ―collectives‖ cannot be sources 
and stewards of knowledge in meaningful and legally significant 
ways—or that anyone or any group necessarily is such a source or 
steward.  I do argue that in the current Feist-encouraged environment 
 
 144. See BOYLE, supra note 90. 
 145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 146. See Oliar, supra note 46. 
 147. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 22.  
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of copyright as creativity law, law and digital culture lack the kinds of 
markers to help identify and sort the teachers from the learners that 
were easier to come by and interpret in the analog world of unique (or 
more unique) artifacts—the sorts of markers that an artist (and art 
lover) such as van Gogh may have taken more or less for granted.  
Putting knowledge in the center of these issues offers policymakers 
and scholars a number of potential advantages over a sole focus on 
creativity.  Because those advantages may or may not be realized, I 
characterize them as implications.148   
Copyright as knowledge law suggests the following 
implications.  The first is that it offers a natural foundation for 
aligning individualistic perspectives on intellectual property law149 
with institutional perspectives.  Those two perspectives are often 
viewed as being in tension with each other, particularly if creative 
people, framed as complex, autonomous beings, are contrasted with 
firms, framed as economic constructs.150  A useful integration of the 
two perspectives situates individuals in an institutional context, 
giving primacy to neither as an analytic starting point.  Forms of 
knowledge are often closely aligned with specific institutional settings.  
Science, scientific research, scientists, and disciplines and 
organizations dedicated to scientific research are among the best 
known, as an example that is usually linked to patent law.  Fine art, 
fine artists, curators, art historians, and museums offer an example 
that is linked closely to copyright.  New and emerging institutions, 
and dynamic institutions, are increasingly parts of the setting of 
 
 148. Even if copyright as knowledge law were treated as a grand thought experiment, its 
unexpected nature makes the exercise worthwhile. Knowledge bears thinking about, and 
rethinking. Borges reported on ―a certain Chinese encyclopedia entitled Celestial Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge‖ which recorded that  
animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) 
those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray 
dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they 
were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel‘s hair brush, 
(l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies 
from a distance. 
Jorge Luis Borges, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins (1942), reprinted in OTHER 
INQUISITIONS: 1937-1952, at 101, 103 (Ruth L. C. Simms trans., University of Texas Press 1964).  
 149. See supra note 18 (describing individualistic perspectives found in the work of 
Professors Benkler and Cohen). 
 150. Compare ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL 
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2009) (offering a thorough defense of legal protection for 
the spiritual dimension of human creativity), with Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The 
Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (2007) (describing the impact of intellectual property rights on the ―make or 
buy‖ decision that characterizes the boundary of the classic firm). 
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intellectual property law and policy.151  Copyright as knowledge law 
opens the door to investigating and understanding their virtues and 
drawbacks as actors in themselves.   
The second implication of copyright as knowledge law is that it 
opens the door to exploring the ―who?‖ of copyright, along with the 
related ―how?‖ and ―why?‖ of copyright, as part of a matrix of 
questions that is coupled with a meaningful inquiry into the ―what?‖ of 
copyright.  I began this Article with the argument that creativity 
offers an unhelpful set of ―what?‖ questions in copyright law, leading 
to an equally unhelpful emphasis on ―who?‖ questions to the exclusion 
of other topics.152  Knowledge as copyright‘s ―what?‖ requires 
investigating that ―what?,‖ rather than ignoring it.   
The third and final implication of copyright as knowledge law 
is that it enables legitimate inquiries into both the processes of 
knowledge production and distribution (among other things) and into 
knowledge products themselves.  Inquiries into the processes of 
creativity have, until recently, been suspect,153 and recent explorations 
of the sources of creativity have tried, in large part, to peer into the 
creator‘s soul, or at least into the creator‘s heart.154  As philosophy, 
psychology, and sociology, this approach to source is interesting in the 
abstract.  As a foundation for law and policymaking, it is at least 
incomplete, because it does not take account of other legitimate 
interests at work in the copyright system, and at worst it is unhelpful, 
because it runs the risk of focusing law and policy excessively on 
outcomes that are internal to individuals and insufficiently on 
outcomes that are external, in society.  Copyright as knowledge law 
should direct policymakers and analysts to focus on the external 
manifestations of human behavior, both individually and collectively, 
rather than on internal questions of motivation and belief.  
Administratively, this simplifies the costs of copyright as a legal 
system; policymakers, copyright litigants and judges can limit the 
scope of expensive investigations into the psychic motivations for and 
benefits of creativity as bases for copyright rules and judgments.  
Normatively, it points to the benefits of knowledge law in terms of 
making the world a better place as well as making all of us better 
people.   
 
 151. See, e.g., Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 94 (proposing an 
institutional framework for analyzing ―cultural commons‖). 
 152. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing how copyright law usually 
treats the work itself as the best evidence of its creativity). 
 154. See KWALL, supra note 150; Tushnet, supra note 22. 
